Bond markets
Banking
POLICY MISSIONS
MAKING THE EUROSYSTEM A CENTRAL BANK
DEALING WITH EUROPEAN UNEMPLOYMENT
MANAGING FINANCIAL TRANSFORMATIONS
COPING WITH A LACK OF POLITICAL UNION
CONCLUSION
The importance of the monetary strategy for a successful start of European monetary policy
The new monetary policy instruments and procedures for the euro area
Minimum reserve system
Introduction
Monetary policy strategy of the ESCB
Pushing the boundaries of the process of European integration
Pushing the boundaries of stability-oriented economic policies
Pushing the boundaries in the development of financial markets
The Eurosystem and the equity markets
Introduction
The monetary policy strategy
Accountability and transparency
Навигация
COPING WITH A LACK OF POLITICAL UNION
Европейская денежная система
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7. COPING WITH A LACK OF POLITICAL UNION
The fourth challenge consists in coping with the lack of a political union. The relationship between monetary and political union and whether the latter should be a precondition for the former has been a central issue in the European debate well before the establishment of the Delors Committee in 1988. While I do think that there is a lack of political union and that this lack constitutes a serious challenge for the Eurosystem, I also think that the expression "lack of political union" is often used in an unclear way that blurs the issue. Let me thus first consider two meanings of this expression with which I do not concur.
First, I do not concur with the idea that there is no political union in Europe today. It is not because the content and the competence of the European Union are mainly economic, that its nature and historical role are not political. Even before the single currency, EU competence extended over virtually the whole Corpus Iuris of economic activity, from the establishment of "the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital" (the four freedoms proclaimed by Article 3 of the Treaty) to external economic relationships. To understand how very political these issues are, it should suffice to think about the place they take in the US political debate today, or have taken in the politics of our countries before the creation of the European Community. Moreover, the institutional architecture of the European Union is entirely that of a political system, not that of an international organisation based on intergovernmental co-operation: a legislative capacity that prevails over that of Member States, a judicial power, a directly elected Parliament.
Second, I do not concur with the idea that Monetary Union has developed outside the political process. Quite the contrary is true. The establishment of a single currency in the European Union has been achieved because of the strong political determination of elected governments over a full decade, from June 1988 to May 1998. It is significant that during that long period continuity has not been broken by repeated changes of political majority in virtually all countries except Germany. Technocrats, i.e. central bankers, have "only" played their role, crucial as it may be. They have provided expertise, from the drafting of the blueprint to the preparatory work for the actual start of the system. And, no less important, they have loyally accepted the limits of their role and recognised that the ultimate decisions have belonged to elected politicians. This is the meaning of the two statements of July 1988 and March 1998 with which the Bundesbank has defined its position at the beginning and the end of the crucial decade. "In der Beschrдnkung zeigt sich der Meister".
The establishment of a single currency is a strongly political event in its genesis and a profound social and cultural change in its nature. As economists and central bankers we pay limited attention to notes and coins because they are a minor and endogenous component of the money stock. For many politicians, however, Monetary Union meant little else than a common banknote. They saw, better than us, that for the people money has to do with the perception of the society to which they belong and, ultimately, with their culture. As such, money goes well beyond the economic sphere of human action. Indeed, the act whereby we accept to provide goods or services to an unknown person in exchange for pieces of paper that have no intrinsic value is perhaps the most significant and widespread testimony of the social contract that binds people. This is why coinage and money printing have always been a prerogative of the State.
Yet, for two main reasons it remains true that Europe has a lack of political union. First, the European Union is still not the ultimate provider of internal and external security, the two key functions that constitute the raison d'кtre of the modern State. Second, EU institutions still fail to comply with the key constitutional principles that constitute the heritage of western democracies: foundation of the legislative and executive functions on the popular vote, majority principle, equilibrium of powers.
Why does the lack of political union constitute a challenge for the Eurosystem? I would answer as follows.
In a period of less than thirty years money has abandoned both the anchors it has had since the earliest times: metal and the sovereign. It is true that central banks have struggled for years to free the printing press from the influence of the modern sovereign, as they struggled in the past to free it from the influence of private interests. It is equally true that the present status of the Eurosystem in the constellation of public powers is exceptionally favourable. However, only a superficial thinker could confuse independence with solitude and take the view that the lack of political union strengthens the position of the central bank and makes it freer to fulfil its mission.
The security on which a sound currency assesses its role cannot be provided exclusively by the central bank. It derives from a number of elements that only the State or, more broadly, a political union as previously defined, can provide. When we say that a currency is a "safe haven" we refer not only to the quality and credibility of its central bank, but to the solidity of the whole social, political and economic structure to which it belongs. And historical experience shows that when that structure appears to weaken, the currency weakens, irrespective of the actions of the central bank. A strong currency requires a strong economy and a strong polity, not only a competent central bank. The central bank is, and should remain, an institution with too limited a mission to replace the lack of a political union.
The problems posed by the coexistence of a single currency with a still unachieved political union will influence both practical and intellectual activity in the coming years. They will have implications for the central banker, the politician and, more generally, the citizen. For the politician the implication is that his political decision to move ahead with Monetary Union in advance of political union contains an implicit commitment to work for the completion of political union. The central banker should be aware of the special difficulties and responsibilities deriving from this anomalous condition. On the one hand he will have to cope with this situation and adapt his attitudes to a composite - EU and national - institutional architecture, one that lacks the simplicity he was used to and in which the Eurosystem now represents the most advanced supranational component. On the other he should be prepared for the further evolution of that same architecture. Finally, from the citizens that we all are, it will require a deeper reflection about the multiple "social contracts" he is part of, and the loyalties they entail.
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